Moral Uncertainty

Cover -- Moral Uncertainty -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Why We Should Take Moral Uncertainty Seriously -- Introduction -- I. Why We Should Be Morally Uncertain -- The Difficulty Of Ethics -- Moral Disagreement -- Overconfidence -- Ii. The Motivation For Taking Moral Uncertainty Seriously -- Iii. Objections To Taking Moral Uncertainty Seriously -- The Fetishism Objection -- The Regress Objection -- The Blameworthiness Objection -- The Conscientiousness Objection -- Disanalogy With Prudential Reasoning -- Conclusion Chapter 2: Maximizing Expected Choiceworthiness -- Introduction -- I. Against My Favorite Theory -- Ii. In Favour Of Trade-offs -- Iii. In Favour Of Treating Moral And Empirical Uncertainty Analogously -- Iv. Two Objections To Mec -- Demandingness -- Supererogation -- Conclusion -- Chapter 3: Ordinal Theories And The Social Choice Analogy -- Introduction -- I. Intertheoretic Comparisons And Ordinal Theories -- Ii. Moral Uncertainty And The Social Choice Analogy -- Iii. Some Voting Systems -- Iv. The Borda Rule -- Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Interval-scale Theories And Variance Voting -- Introduction I. Intertheoretic Incomparability -- Ii. Two Unsatisfactory Proposals -- Iii. Variance Voting -- Iv. Two Arguments For Variance Voting -- Distance From The Uniform Theory -- The Expected Choice-worthiness Of Voting -- V. Option-individuation And Measure -- Vi. Broad Vs Narrow -- Vii. How To Act In Varying Informational Conditions -- Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Intertheoretic Comparisons Of Choice-worthiness -- Introduction -- I. Against Scepticism -- Ii. Structural Accounts -- Iii. Five Arguments Against Structural Accounts -- Varied-extension Cases -- Discontinuity With Universal Indifference Incoherent Beliefs-weighing Values -- Incoherent Beliefs-too Much Comparability -- Amplified Theories -- Iv. Non-structural Accounts -- V. Against Two Common Ground Accounts -- Vi. Against Two Universal Scale Accounts -- Vii. A Universal Scale Account -- Viii. The Metaphysical And Epistemic Questions -- Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Fanaticism And Incomparability -- Introduction -- I. Fanaticism -- Ii. Infectious Incomparability -- Conclusion -- Chapter 7: Metaethical Implications: Cognitivism Versus Non-cognitivism -- Introduction -- I. The Challenge For Non-cognitivism Ii. Ecumenical Non-cognitivism -- Iii. Lenman's Version Of Ecumenical Expressivism -- Iv. Ridge's Version Of Ecumenical Expressivism -- V. Initial Problems And Cross-attitudinal Comparisons -- Vi. A Dilemma -- Vii. Sepielli's Account -- Viii. Problems For The Being For Account Of Normative Certitude -- Gradability -- Cross-attitudinal Comparisons -- Motivational Maladies -- The Wrong Kind Of Reasons -- Ix. Normalization Of Being For -- Conclusion -- Chapter 8: Practical Ethics Given Moral Uncertainty -- Introduction -- I. Implications For Normative Ethics -- Beneficence -- Partiality William Macaskill, Krister Bykvist And Toby Ord. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Electronic Reproduction. Ann Arbor, Mi Available Via World Wide Web.